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UNWILLING AVATARS:
IDEALISM AND DISCRIMINATION

IN CYBERSPACE
MARY ANNE FRANKS*
I made image upon image for my use...
I made god upon god...
I made the gods less than men
for I was a man and they my work.
- H.D., Pygmalion

t

INTRODUCTION: GODS AND MONSTERS
Few would deny that cyberspace has a dark side. The of
such negative incidents and perhaps even more widely as to the
appropriate response to these incidents. I On one side are voices
calling for increased regulation of the Internet: user codes of
conduct, 2 the reform of Section 230 of the 1996
Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami Law School. I am
grateful to Daniel Abebe, Adam Badawi, Douglas Baird, Mary Anne Case,
Anupam Chander, Jens Damman, Mark Egerman, Aziz Huq, Brian Leitcr, Saul
Levmorc, Catharine MacKinnon, Adam Muchmorc, Martha Nussbaum, Eric
Posner, Laura Rosenbury, Ardcn Rowell, Adam Samaha, Geof Stone, Lior
Strahilevitz, Madhavi Sunder, and participants in the Regulation of Family, Scx,
and Gender Workshop at the University of Chicago Law School for helpful
discussion and feedback.

For reports and symposia on such incidents, see, e.g.,

INTERNET SAFETY

TECHNICAL TASK FORCE, ENHANCING CHILD SAFETY & ONLINE TECHNOLOGIES

(2008), http://cybcr.law.harvard.cdu/pubrelease/isttf.
2 See, e.g., Tim O'Reilly, Draft Blogger s Code of Conduct, O'REILLY
RADAR (Apr. 8, 2007), http://radar.oreilly.com/archivcs/2OO7/O4/draftbloggers-l.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2010); A Blogger's Code of Ethics,
CYBERJOURNALIST.NET (Apr. 15, 2003),

http://www.cybcrjoumalist.net/ncws/ 000215.php; see also Brad Stone, A
Call for Manners in the World of Nasty Blogs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/09/technology/09blog.html?
_r=3&scp=l &sq=manners%2Onasty%20blogs&st=cse.
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Communications Decency Act (CDA § 230), 3 and stricter laws4
regarding online defamation, threats, and invasions of privacy.
On the other side are those who argue that the benefits offered
by the free and unregulated exchange of ideas that characterizes
the medium of cyberspace far outweigh the harms facilitated by
the Internet. 5
The latter view is based on what this Article calls
cyberspace idealism- the view of cyberspace as a utopian
realm of the mind where all can participate equally, free from
social, historical, and physical restraints. Though the high-flown
rhetoric of early cyberspace idealists 6 may now seem somewhat
dated, the liberationist vision at its core maintains its hold on our
(increasingly online) collective imagination. This vision is a
quasi-Cartesian one: a vision of human identity as fundamentally
divided between mind and matter, where matter is limiting and
temporal and, as such, in many ways inferior to the mind. For
those who hold this vision, cyberspace presents the opportunity
to escape physical limitations, both geographic and bodily.
The concept of the avatar, broadly conceived, is central to
cyberspace idealism. The term is generally used to refer to
users' virtual self-representation-from sophisticated graphics to
simple pseudonyms-in computer games, virtual reality systems
and chat rooms. As used in this Article, an avatar also stands
3 47 U.S.C. §230 (2000).
4 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61,
95 (2009); Brittan Heller, Of Legal Rights and Moral Wrongs: A Case Study of
Interniet Defamation, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 279, 285 (2007); David A.
Myers, Defamation and the Quiescent Anarchy of the Internet: A Case Study of
Cyber Targeting, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 667 (2006).
5 See e.g., FREE SPEECH, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://
www.eff.org/issues/frec-specch (last visited June 20, 2011) ("Preserving the
lnternet's open architecture is critical to sustaining free speech. But this
technological capacity means little without sufficient legal protections. If laws
can censor you, limit access to certain information, or restrict use of
communication tools, then the Intemet's incredible potential will go unrealized.")

6 See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace, http://homes.eff.org/-barlow/Dcclaration-Final.html (last visited:
June 20, 2011); David R Johnson and David Post, Law and Borders-the Rise of
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
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more generally for the unique mode of being that cyberspace
allows. The very structure of cyberspace facilitates a wall
between a person's "real" identity and their virtual one. The term
"avatar" is Sanskrit for "incarnation," and the religious
resonance is telling. Cyberspace provides, according to this
view, a powerful counter to the real world. In real life,
individuals are constrained by physical limitations, with all the
prejudice and division this engenders. In cyberspace, the only
limitation is an individual's imagination and creativity.
Cyberspace idealism often produces conflicting accounts of
the "realness" of cyberspace. On the one hand, cyberspace is
often regarded as more real than real life-that is, the ability to
control the terms of representation makes cyberspace existence
more genuine. On the other hand, harms committed in
cyberspace are often dismissed as "not really real," as they are
by their nature not physical, bodily harms. The way this tension
plays out in terms of the law's recommended role in cyberspace
can yield schizophrenic results: freedom of speech, for example,
in cyberspace is "really real" and must be vigorously protected;
harassment in cyberspace is not "really real" and thus should not
be taken very seriously.
This is not to say that cyberspace idealists do not find any
cyberspace practices harmful. Many idealists do not object to
tort and criminal remedies for defamation or stalking that occurs
in cyberspace. The idealist position does, however, treat such
harms as aberrations, as occasional malfunctions in an otherwise
smoothly operating system. This Article argues that the idealist
view sets up a false picture of cyberspace that preempts the
proper evaluation of the harms of cyberspace harassment.
Specifically, the idealist view fails to recognize-or at least to
take seriously-how the same features of cyberspace that
amplify the possibilities of individual liberty also amplify the
potential for discrimination. Cyberspace idealism drastically
downplays the Internet's power to activate discriminatory
stereotypes and social scripts.
This Article focuses on the particular discriminatory
phenomenon of the unwilling avatar. In stark contrast to the way
users exert control over their online identities, the creation of
unwilling avatars involves invoking individuals' real bodies for
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the purposes of threatening, defaming, or sexualizing them
without consent. Sometimes the creation of unwilling avatars
takes a very literal form: for example, hacking into the account
of a gamer and using her avatar as though it were your own, or
creating a false profile of a real person on a social networking
site. Other examples of unwilling avatars are more figurative.
For example, women have been targeted'for "revenge porn," a
practice where ex-boyfriends and husbands post to the web
sexually explicit photographs and videos of them without their
consent. Another example is the case of Kathy Sierra, who was
attacked by anonymous bloggers and posters with manipulated
photographs and threats of death and sexual violence. Female
law school students also become unwilling avatars when they
are targeted by graphic and violent sexual threads at message
boards such as AutoAdmit.com. 7 In most cases of cyberspace
harassment, the perpetrators use pseudonyms 8 while identifying
their targets not only by name but often also with private
information such as home addresses and social security
numbers. This informational asymmetry further aggravates the
inequality resulting from cyberspace harassment.
The unwilling avatars phenomenon affects the way that
many different groups interact with cyberspace, among them
racial and sexual minorities. This Article focuses specifically on
the way this phenomenon affects women, not because the impact
on other affected groups is less important or interesting, but
because the gendered dimension of harassment and abusive
behavior online is worthy of independent study. 9 Cyber
harassment affects women disproportionately, both in terms of
frequency and in terms of impact. Moreover, there is a
particularly poignant irony in the nonconsensual sexualized
embodiment of women in cyberspace. As will be discussed in
7See sources and accompanying

text

supra, note 7.

8 Users generally must choose a screen name before they can post
comments or enter chat rooms. Few people opt for their real name, choosing
instead to post under a pseudonym.

I Some cybcr harassment is also perpetrated by women against men, and
by women against women. It is not yet clear how much cyber harassment
follows these patterns, and so this Article will refrain from addressing those
forms in detail.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW

more detail below, cyberspace can present particularly
compelling opportunities. for women because they feel the
constraints of physical vulnerability, especially sexual
vulnerability, more acutely than men. In that case, the extent to
which this physical vulnerability is re-imposed upon themprincipally by men-in cyberspace is truly disheartening. If
cyberspace harassment makes many women feel less safe online
than they do in real life, and more exposed and vulnerable to
sexual aggression both on and offline, this undermines the
idealistic promise of cyberspace in a significant way. The
volume and viciousness of cyber-attacks--especially sexualized
attacks-on women by men suggests that cyberspace cannot be
thought of as a place where, on balance, women and men can
participate equally. Rather, it is a place where existing gender
inequalities are amplified and entrenched.
This Article is concerned with gender discrimination as an
interference with liberty and equality. It advocates for an
expansive notion of liberty, one that includes the freedom to
think and act and develop one's life as one wishes, without
political or social restraints, except where that liberty would
harm others. 10 Though John Stuart Mill is invoked frequently in
debates concerning the relationship between law and liberty, his
insight that social restraints on liberty are often more pernicious
and difficult to challenge than political ones is often forgotten.
This insight is key to any complete analysis of discrimination's
effects on liberty. Restraints on liberty can manifest in the form
of formal legal restrictions, as they did in laws permitting
slavery, but they can also manifest as social restrictions, as they
do in cross-bumings and racist propaganda. An AfricanAmerican man who could not enter a restaurant that had a
"whites only" sign in the window experienced a once-legally
permissible infringement on his liberty; an African-American
man who avoids the same restaurant because of the racist jeers
and taunts of other customers experiences a social infringement
on his liberty. This is not to collapse the two experiences into
one-for there are important differences between them-but
merely to underscore the point that infringements on liberty can
occur both through legal-political means and social means.

10JOHN STUART

MILL, ON LIBERTY

13 (1869).
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A world in which members of certain groups avoid places,
professions, opportunities, and experiences because they fear de
facto, rather than de jure, discrimination-based not on their
ideas but on their bodies (e.g. because they are women, or gay,
or black)-is not a world that maximizes liberty."I The virtual
world has not only reproduced the various forms of
discrimination that exist in the physical world, but has allowed
them to flourish in ways that would not be possible in the
physical world. Again, one could use any number of examples,
racism 12 and homophobia among them, to illustrate this
principle, but this Article deals specifically with sexism in
cyberspace. Women shut down their blogs, avoid websites they
formerly frequented, take down social networking profiles,
refrain from engaging in online political commentary, and
choose not to maintain potentially lucrative or personally
rewarding online presences due to cyberspace harassment.13 The
harms they experience also spill over into their offline lives:
women have dropped out of school, changed jobs, moved cities,
gone into hiding, experienced mental breakdowns, and, in
extreme cases, committed suicide due to cyberspace
harassment.' 4 The harassment that they experience is
promulgated by users who overwhelmingly self-identify as male,
though most remain anonymous beyond that, and is
overwhelmingly characterized by obscene, sexually violent,
sexist language and behavior.
When cyberspace idealists argue against increased legal
regulation because of its implications for liberty, they ignore the
fact that cyberspace harassment has already undermined and
compromised liberty. Sometimes this ignorance is genuine;
sometimes it is thoroughly disingenuous, in that many
I It is true, however, that many scholars argue that only the first form is
properly under law's control. See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty,
in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969); ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA (1974).
12 See e.g., Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (2000);
Margaret Chon, Erasing Race?: A Critical Race Feminist View of Internet
Identity-Shifting, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 439 (2000).

'3 See Citron, supra note 5, at 64.
14Id. at 68.
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cyberspace idealists are fully aware that the liberty they
desperately wish to defend is liberty only for others like them.' 5
In either case, it is necessary to explode the myth of cyberspace
as a state of liberty that deserves wide deference and instead
view it for what it is: a state of license in which certain groups
with power oppress, threaten and harass groups with less power.
As Locke described it in Two Treatises on Government, a state of
license is one in which some groups have taken liberty at the
expense of others.' 6 Such a state is no longer "natural,"
according to Locke, and as such requires intervention of the
law. 17 Cyberspace has become a state of license in which women
as a group are afforded less liberty than men as a group and thus
must be regulated through laws that distribute liberty more
equally. If cyberspace is not to be merely a state of license, we
must turn our attention to finding the best possible legal
responses to harassment.
Part I of this Article begins with a description of
cyberspace idealism- who propounds it, how, and with what
effect. This Part highlights the conceptual significance of the
avatar in cyberspace idealism and investigates how the fantasy
of cyberspace as a Lockean "state of liberty" closely tracks and
mutually reinforces liberal conventional wisdom about the
"marketplace of ideas." Part I complicates the picture of
cyberspace advanced by idealists, detailing the phenomenon of
"unwilling avatars" and its effects on women in particular. This
Part demonstrates how cyberspace more closely resembles a
Lockean state of license than a state of liberty and looks to
Mill's conception of social restraints on liberty for insight into
the restriction of harmful speech. This Part also shows how the
nature of cyberspace magnifies the harmful effects of
discrimination. Part III describes how the phenomenon of
unwilling avatars serves as a "double embodiment" that not only
undermines women's ability to escape or subvert real-world
15 Anthony Ciolli and Jarret Cohen, the original owners of
AutoAdmit.com, may fall into the latter cateogry. See infra note 57 and
accompanying text.
16

JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT

AND A LETTER

CONCERNING TOLERATION 102 (lan Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1689).
17 1d. at 154-56
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inequality in cyberspace, but also reinforces that inequality. Part
IV addresses objections to the analysis of cyberspace harassment
offered here.
I.

Cyberspace Idealism: Paradise?
A. Avatars in Utopia

As many scholars have described it, the creation of
cyberspace is only the most recent of human attempts to create a
utopia. 18 The utopian drive is certainly not new: it can be
observed in rhetoric about the New World, the Wild West,
Communist Russia, cults, and any number of hippie
communes.19 The concept of paradise seems to exert a particular
influence over western Judeo-Christian civilization, reflected (or
possibly produced) by its literal placement at the beginning of
human time in the Bible. Paradise in Christianity is much more
than just the Garden of Eden; it is a metaphysical, originary
20
condition-the pure state from which humans have fallen.
Freud proposed that religious belief was largely driven by a
commonly-felt nostalgia for a lost state of perfect wholenesswhat he referred to as the "oceanic feeling" (a term coined by
Romain Rolland) and surmised was really a dim remembrance
of the womb. 21 Whatever its literal source, the belief in and
nostalgia for a state of perfection has been a frequent theme in
Western literature, exploration and politics. 22

I8

See

LAWRENCE LESsIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 4

(1999).
9

' 1d.
20 See Romans 5:12; Aurelius Augustin, Bishop of Hippo, A Treatise on
the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, and on the Baptism of Infants, in A SELECT
LIBRARY OF THE NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH
58-59 (Philip Schaff cd., 1987); JOHN MILTON, "PARADISE LOST: A POEM
WRITTEN IN TEN BOOKS": AN AUTHORITATIVE TEXT OF THE 1667 FIRST EDITION
10 (John T. Shawcross & Michael Lieb eds., 2007) (1667).
21

See SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION 34-35 (James

Strachey ed., W. D. Robson-Scott trans., 1964) (1927).
22 There is even an entire academic field of utopian studies. See About the
Society, THE SOC. FOR UTOPIAN STUD., http://www.utoronto.ea/utopia/about.html
(last visited June 20, 2011).
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It is not difficult to see why cyberspace, especially in the
early days of the internet, would incite such utopian fervor. As
noted by numerous writers, cyberspace provides a heady
opportunity to escape one's physical boundaries, both
geographical and personal, in a more extreme way than ever
before. In cyberspace, as the saying goes, "no one knows you',re
a dog."'23 Or a woman, or a Jew, or overweight, or deaf, or
whether you're in Arkansas, or Massachusetts, or St. Petersburg.
At its most basic level, cyberspace seems to allow people to
control who they want to be and to go wherever they want to go.
While most people think of avatars primarily as
sophisticated visual icons of virtual worlds and computer games
(e.g., the avatars in Second Life, where users can choose from a
wide range of body types, skin colors, facial features, clothing,
and accessories), the term encompasses more minimalist
representations as well, such as pseudonyms, also known as
"handles," in online chat rooms, blogs, and instant messaging.
What is common to all avatars, however, is that they allow users
to make choices about their virtual identity. In theory, no matter
how one looks, dresses, or walks in real life, a user can create his
or her own identity within the range of options available in a
given environment. 24 At a minimum, avatars allow users to
separate themselves from who they "really" are. Avatars can
behave in ways their users never would in real life, making it
possible for individuals to communicate and act in ways
foreclosed in the offline world.
In English, the term "avatar" has been used since the 1980s
to describe the visual or textual representations of computer
users. The term was first used in this context in Ultima, a
computer game series created by Richard Garriot in 1981. In the
fourth game of that series, the player's quest is to become
enlightened in the "Eight Virtues" in order to become a spiritual
model in the fictional land of Britannia. Once a player achieves
23 Peter Steiner, Cartoon, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You 're a Dog,
NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61.
24There are reasons to be skeptical about the broad claims made by avatar
enthusiasts- the avatar options available to users in a given virtual environment
may themselves reflect racist, sexist, or heteronormative biases-but that is not
the focus of this Article.
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enlightenment in the virtues-honesty, compassion, valor,
justice, honor, sacrifice, spirituality, and humility- he or she
becomes the Avatar. Garriot was reportedly influenced by a
television show about the avatars of Hinduism and the sixteen
virtues that they were said to have to master.25 The term avatar
was also used in Neal Stephenson's 1992 novel Snow Crash. 26 In
the novel, Stephenson posits a virtual-reality based successor to
the Internet, the Metaverse. Users' virtual representations of
themselves in the Metaverse are called avatars. Those who can
only access the Metaverse through public terminals are marked
by the poor visual quality of their avatars, which greatly
influence social status. Snow Crash was a hugely popular novel
and is credited with popularizing the term "avatar" to refer to the
virtual representations of gamers and computer users more
generally.
It is no accident that the identities users create in virtual
reality settings are called avatars. The Sanskrit word "Avatara" is
often translated into English as "incarnation," but literally means
"descent. 2 7 In Hinduism, the term generally describes the
28
descent of the Supreme Being into lower spiritual realms.

Vaishnava Hindus, who worship Vishnu as the supreme god,
believe that Vishnu has ten principal avatars. Each avatar
appears in a different historical age to save the world from strife
and destruction. Vishnu's avatars have taken various forms,
including animals, humans and beings that are half animal and
half human. Religious scholars have noted that the Hindu
conception of the avatar bears much similarity to the Christian
conception of incarnation-a divine being that takes on human
form.
The religious resonance of the term "avatar" is thus
appropriate. The power to shape one's virtual embodiment
25SHAY ADDAMS, THE OFFICIAL BOOK OF ULTIMA (1990).
26 NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH
27

(1992).

CARL OLSON, THE MANY COLORS OF HINDUISM:

A THEMATIC-

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 148 (2007).
28 See JEANEANE D. FOWLER, HINDUISM: BELIEFS AND PRACTICES

(1997).

17
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evokes a sense of liberation and transcendence, perhaps even a
sense of divinity. The real world is riven by prejudices of all
kinds; race, gender, class and physical appearance create social
stratifications and hierarchies that are difficult for individuals to
challenge. In cyberspace, however, users have the opportunity to
escape those constraints. The power of the avatar is, on this
view, the source of cyberspace's radical social potential.
freed from
Cyberspace, populated by self-created avatars and
29
physical constraints, evokes visions of a paradise.
B. The State of Nature and the Marketplace of Ideas:
Two Ways of Looking at the Law
Given that cyberspace offers significant liberating
possibilities, it was predictable that a certain idealism would
spring up with the widespread use of the Internet. The new
possibilities of interaction, activity, and information for
individuals who might never have possessed the confidence or
ability to partake of them in real life are exciting. This
excitement lends itself easily to idealization, reflected in rhetoric
about cyberspace's unique capacity for equality and the free
exchange of ideas. As John Perry Barlow put it in his
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace:
We are creating a world that all may enter
without privilege or prejudice accorded by
race, economic power, military force, or
station of birth. We are creating a world where
anyone, anywhere may express his or her
of
beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear
30
being coerced into silence or conformity.
A striking feature of this rhetoric is its similarity to the way John
Locke describes the "state of nature." 31 Locke's description of
the state of nature, contra Hobbes' darkly pessimistic view, is of

29 But see, e.g., Lauren Bans, Same Shit, Different Life, BITCH MAG. 39
(2008), at 57 (criticizing racism and sexism in Second Life).

30Barlow, supranote 7.
31LOCKE, supra note 17, at 101.
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a state of liberty and equality: a paradise. 32 As Locke tells it, the
state of nature is a state of liberty: "[A] state of perfect freedom
[for mankind] to order their actions and dispose of their
possessions and persons as they think fit." 33 Locke's conception
of liberty is closely tied, if not indistinguishable from, equality:
A state also of equality, wherein all the power
and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having
more than another; there being nothing more
evident than that creatures of the same species
and rank, promiscuously born to all the same
advantages of nature and the use of the same
faculties, should also be equal one amongst
34
another without subordination or subjection.
Locke describes the social contract-the intervention of the laws
-as irreparably altering the state of nature. As discussed below,
the story Locke tells about the social contract is a story of a Fall:
the story of how mankind devolved from its state of perfect
liberty and provoked the distribution (and necessarily partial
forsaking) of liberty. Locke implies that if mankind had
maintained the state of nature, had not "fallen," rules, laws and
35
the attendant loss of liberty would never have been necessary.
It follows, then, that if one maintains that cyberspace is not
"fallen," that it is still paradise, then rules and laws are not
necessary there either. And this is just the conclusion that
Barlow makes in his Declaration. The occasion for the
Declaration was, in fact, the passage of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996. To this attempt to restrict and regulate cyberspace
content, Barlow responded: "I declare the global social space we
are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you

32

See

KIM IAN PARKER, THE BIBLICAL POLITICS OF JOHN LOCKE 129

(2004).
33 LOCKE, supra note 17, at 101.
34 Id.
35 Id. at

154-56.
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seek to impose upon us.' 36 Cyberspace, according to the idealist

view, is a paradise that needed no externally imposed laws.
Cyberspace idealism has undergone an interesting
transformation in recent years. Contemporary anti-regulation
rhetoric is more often than not characterized in free speech terms
akin to John Stuart Mill's "marketplace of ideas" instead of
Locke's "liberty." In 1990 Barlow, along with John Gilmore and
Mitch Kapor, founded the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
an organization that has gained considerable influence in the
debate over cyberspace regulation. The EFF's stated purpose is
to protect "rights in cyberspace" and fight off "bad
legislation. '37 It was established, according to its founders, in
response to a basic threat to speech. 38 The EFF's rhetoric does
not have the anarchic tone of Barlow's manifesto ("I declare the
global social space we are building to be naturally independent
of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us"), 39 but is grounded

instead in law itself, specifically, the First Amendment.
The evolution of cyberspace idealists' relationship to the
law is interesting for many reasons. It is unclear what really
drove the shift from anarchism to civil liberties-was it merely
an inevitable tempering of radical views over time? A sense of
resignation (if you can't beat 'em, join 'em)? Or does it indicate
some more fundamental change in understanding, perhaps a
recognition that there is no liberty without law?
The most notable characteristic of this updated rhetoric,
though, is how it simultaneously invokes and obscures the
importance of law. This new idealism still insists that cyberspace
is a realm of unfettered freedom, where liberty, now most often
framed as freedom of speech, is maximized to a degree
unmatched in the real world: "In countless ways, the Internet is
radically enhancing our access to information and empowering
36 Barlow, supra note 7.

37About EFF, ELEC.
visited June 20, 2011).

FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/about (last

38See id.
39 Barlow, supra note 7.
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us to share ideas with the entire world. Speech thrives online,
freed of limitations inherent in other media and created by
traditional gatekeepers. '40 Cyberspace, it is claimed, is the
genuine marketplace of ideas, where anyone can speak and
where the best ideas will prevail. Attempts to regulate website
content or restrict access to certain sites interfere with this great
egalitarian enterprise. Thus, the EFF warns: "If laws can censor
you, limit access to certain information, or restrict use of
communication tools, then the Internet's incredible potential will
go unrealized." 41
According to this vision, cyberspace is a place where, left
alone, the great project of freedom is being realized. Idealists
believe that this status quo is the fully-functioning marketplace
of ideas, a site of genuine liberty and equality that is interrupted
by regulation efforts. Thus, any attempt to change the status quo
is viewed as prima facie illegitimate and liberty-depriving.
According to cyberspace idealists, the regulation of Internet
speech can only deprive its users of liberty. This view
necessarily ignores the fact that cyberspace's very legitimacy is
grounded in a highly legalistic conception of free speech. 42
11.

UNWILLING AVATARS: THE FALL

Cyberspace idealism unsurprisingly appeals to individuals
who feel their life experiences have been restricted by their
physical identity: by their social status, their age, their gender, or
their physical appearance. Going online allows these individuals
to experience a certain kind of positive disembodiment. One's
"real" race, gender, age, and social status need never be
disclosed in cyberspace, and so negative stereotypes that may
401,1.

4

Id.

42 Or, as Cass Sunstein puts it: "There is no avoiding 'regulation' of the
communications market-of television, print media, and the Intemet. The
question is not whether we will have regulation; it is what kind of regulation we
will have... Those who complain most bitterly about proposed regulation are

often those who profit, often financially, from current regulation ....
What they
are complaining about is not regulation as such-they need regulation-but a
regulatory regime from which they would benefit less than they do under the
current one." CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 154 (2007).
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attach to any of those attributes can be avoided in a way not
possible in real life. Particularly for historically marginalized
groups, the power to re-create oneself and control the public
representation of one's identity through avatars can be liberating.
What happens, then, when individuals are not in control of
their online embodiment? What if one is embodied against one's
will, in places that one never chose to enter, in ways one never
consented to be shown, in graphic and vicious detail for all the
world to see and which may be impossible to erase? We would
surely describe that experience as a profound loss of liberty, the
very antithesis of the freeing process of avatar creation. A world
populated by an increasing number of unwilling avatars, reduced
to their physical characteristics, caricaturized, ventriloquized and
under attack, looks much more like hell than paradise.
A. Bringing in the Women
Christina McCormack 4 3 had been dating fellow University
of Georgia student Richard Baker only a short while before
,things got serious. According to Baker, they moved in together,
got a dog, and exchanged promise rings. 44 They broke up in
January 2007. When a male friend stayed at McCormack's place
for a few days, Baker became enraged. He hacked into
McCormack's MySpace account and sent messages to
McCormack's friend in her name. These messages included
claims that McCormack had certain medical conditions and that
she was still in love with Baker. 45 Baker installed spyware on
McCormack's computer so that he could track her Internet use
and gain access to her IDs and passwords. Finally, he uploaded
naked pictures of McCormack (which he had obtained without
consent) on his Facebook page. In May 2008, Baker was
charged with 32 felonies. News reports as of this writing indicate
43Not her real name-Author has been asked to use pseudonyms for both
the victim and the harasser while the case is pending.
I
Richard Morgan, Revenge Porn, DETAILS, available at http://
www.details.com/sex-relationships/pom-and-perversions/200809/revcnge-porn
(last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
45Lce Shearer, Ex-Lover Got Revenge Online, Athens Police Say,
AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, May 30, 2008, available at http://chronicle.augusta.com/
stories/latest/lat_ 053008_computerrevenge.shtml.
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that he is currently free on bond, awaiting trial. 46
Sayani Chakraborty had never been a member of Orkut, a
social networking site similar to Facebook and MySpace, but she
discovered that someone had created a profile of her on the site
and used it to send offensive messages to her family and
friends. 47 Someone created a similar profile for a schoolgirl in
Delhi, complete with obscene photographs and the girl's home
address and telephone number. 48 The profile came to light after
her family began receiving calls asking to speak with the girl
and referencing the Orkut profile. Eventually, two men came to
her home claiming that the girl had invited them over for sex.49
An Oklahoma State University sophomore named James
Cory Lanier videotaped himself and his 19-year-old girlfriend
having sex. 50 After the woman broke up with him, Lanier
threatened her with physical violence and promised to "ruin her
life."'51 He threatened to upload the videos of the two having sex
to the Internet unless she agreed to continue having sex with
him. His ex-girlfriend reported him to the police, and Lanier was
charged with felony blackmail. That charge was eventually
52
dismissed, and Lanier pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct.

46 Morgan,

supra note 48.

41 Hey, Thats Not Me on the Net!, TIMES OF INDIA, Jan. 29, 2007,
available at http://timesofindia.indiatimcs.com/news/city/ahmedabad-timcs/Hcythats-not-mc-on-the-net/articleshow/1539403.cms.

4'Fake Orkut Profile of Schoolgirl Posted, REDIFF

INDIA ABROAD, Feb. 6,

2007, available at http://www.rcdiff.com/news/2007/feb/06orkut.htm.
49Id.

50 OSU Student Charged With Blackmailing Ex-Girlfriend, Feb. 28, 2007,
available at http://www.ktul.com/news/stories/0907/459290.html.
51Patti Weaver, Blackmail Charge Against Former OSU Student Dropped,
KUSH RADIO, Jan. 29, 2008, http://www.1600kush.com/story.php?

id=I 86&section= I.
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The owners and operators 53 of the message board
AutoAdmit.com, which they characterized as a forum where
individuals could share information about law firms, clerkships,
and succeeding in law school, claimed that it was by
"respect[ing] the merits of the free, uninhibited exchange of
ideas" that the site became the most successful and informative
law school discussion board on the Internet. 54 In March 2005,
Brian Leiter highlighted the pervasive racism and sexism on
AutoAdmit 55 on his blog, Leiter Reports. The message board
achieved increased notoriety in April 2007 after The Washington
Post ran an article about sexist, obscene and racist posts on the
site, focusing on the particularly vicious attacks on female law
school students. 56 These posts included links to pictures of many
of these students, with entire message threads devoted to
"ranking" the women's bodies, discussing their alleged sexual
activities and expressing what users would like to do with them
sexually in graphic and often violent detail. 7 The women in
question were frequently targeted by name, while their attackers
posted under pseudonyms. Several of the women targeted knew
nothing about the site prior to the Post article, and only found
out about it when the threads came up on Google searches or
when friends alerted them. 58 Some of the women attacked on the
site contacted the site's administrators requesting that the
abusive posts be removed, only to be told that no post would be

53Jarrett Cohen and Anthony Ciolli, the latter of which has since claimed
he never had "operator" power, and has since resigned from AutoAdmit. See
David Margolick, Slimed Online, PORTFOLIO.COM, Feb. II, 2009, available at
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-ncws/portfolio/2009/02/1 I/
Two-Lawyers-Fight-Cyber-Bullying?page=2#page=2.
54Eugene Volokh, More from Xoxohth, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://
volokh.com/posts/I I10500300.shtml (Mar. 10, 2005, 18:18 EST).

55 Brian Leiter, Penn Law Student, Anthony Ciolli, Admits to Running
Prelaw Discussion Board Awash in Racist, Anti-Semilic, Sexist Abuse,, LEITER
REPORTS: A PHILOSOPHY BLOG (Mar. II, 2005, 6:12 PM), http://
leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2005/03/penn-law-studen.html.
56See Nakashima, supra note 1.
57Id.
58See Margolick, supra note 57 at 3-4.
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"censored." 59 In some cases, the administrators posted the
women's complaints on the site, leading to further derogatory
name calling and threats to punish them with rape, stalking, or
other abuse. 60 In some of these cases, users posted the women's
61
home addresses and phone numbers.
Kathy Sierra is a programming instructor and a game
developer who runs a blog called Creating Passionate Users.
This blog is centered on discussions about "designing software
that makes people happy. ' 62 At about the same time as the
AutoAdmit controversy broke, Sierra began receiving death
threats in the comments section of her blog. 63 Someone wrote
about slitting her throat and ejaculating; another posted her
photo alongside an image of a noose with a caption: "The only
thing Kathy has to offer is that noose in her neck size."64 On an
external site, a user posted a manipulated photo that appeared to
show Sierra with underwear across her face, struggling to
breathe. The picture was captioned: "I dream of Kathy Sierra...
head first. ' 65 Sierra canceled several speaking engagements and
66
suspended her blog in the wake of the threatening posts.
Chelsea Gorman was a freshman at Vanderbilt University
when she was raped on her way to campus one evening. Gorman
left school for that semester, struggling with panic attacks and
self-blame. When she returned to school in the fall of 2007 she
had only told her family and a few friends about the rape. In

59id. at 4.
60 See Nakashima, supra

note I.

61i
62 ht
63 Id.
64 See Victoria Murphy Barret, Anonymity and the Net, FORBES, Oct. 15,

2007 availableat http://www.forbcs.com/forbes/2007/1015/074.html.
65

1d.

66 Blog Death Threats Spark Debate, BBC NEWS, Mar. 27, 2007,
available at http://ncws.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/tcchnology/6499095.stm.
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March 2008, a friend at another college called to tell her that
someone had posted about her rape on a gossip site called
JuicyCampus.com. On the Vanderbilt University page of the site,
there was a post titled "Chelsea Gorman deserved it." The post
not only announced the rape, but went on to read: "what could
she expect walking around there alone. Everyone thinks she's so
sweet but she got what she deserved. wish i had been the
homeless guy that f***** her."'67 The post became the talk of
Vanderbilt's campus-both the virtual one68on JuicyCampus and
the real one Gorman had to face every day.

Nicole Catsouras was eighteen years old when she died in a
horrific car accident. On October 31, 2006, she and her father
had an argument, and he confiscated the car keys as punishment.
Later that day, Nicole snuck out, taking the car keys with her.
Fifteen minutes later, she crashed into a freeway tollbooth at a
speed of over 100 miles per hour. The collision mangled her
body, nearly decapitating her. The police photographs of the
accident were leaked and published online. The gruesome
images began to appear in chat rooms and fetish websites where
users would discuss, among other things, how Nicole "deserved"
what happened. A MySpace user posted the pictures along with
sexualized commentary about Nicole; another created a fake
69
profile of Nicole that included a close-up of her remains.
Someone posted the Catsouras' home address and encouraged
others to harass the family. Nicole's parents received numerous
pseudonymous emails and text messages that included the
photos, along with vicious captions. They attempted to convince
web site owners to take down the pictures, but met with little
success: "We've asked them to please take down the pictures,
and they've said, 'No, I don't have to because I've got my First

67 Eamon McNiff & Ann Vamey, College Gossip Crackdown: Chelsea
Gorman Speaks Out, May 14, 2008, ABCNEwS.CoM,
=
2020/story?id=4849927&pagc I.
68Id.
69 Barret,

supra note 68.

http://abcncws.go.com/
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Amendment rights'," says Nicole's mother, Lesli Catsouras. 70
Nicole's family uploaded a memorial video of Nicole on
YouTube, hoping that it would help show that they "are a family
with real hearts, and it hurts what people are doing." 71 A number
of vicious and sexist pseudonymous comments were posted on
YouTube in response, including the following: "she got what she
deserved... you wanted equality, fine, fuck that stupid cunt...
hahahaha, she got what she deserved .... 172
The phenomenon of unwanted online embodiment is by no
means a new one. Cyber harassment has existed since the first
cyberspace communities were created. Julian Dibbell's now
infamous article, "A Rape in Cyberspace," describes one such
early instance of virtual violence. 73 LambdaMOO is a stillexisting virtual community founded in 1990 by Pavel Curtis. A
MOO is a kind of MUD (short for multi-user dimension/
dungeon), which is a multi-user, real-time virtual world and
stands for MUD, Object Oriented. The object orientation refers
to the way that users can change the server interface by adding,
new objects and rooms. In 1993, a user called Mr. Bungle, who
had obtained "voodoo power" through his high standing in the
LambdaMOO community, used that power to commit virtual
"rapes" of several female characters and one character of
indeterminate gender.
[Bungle] -could take over the voices and
actions of other characters and make them
appear to do things they did not really do ....
He invoked this power, in this public space,
and took over the voices of these people. Once
70 Jim Avila, Teri Whitcraft, & Scott Michels, A Family's Nightmare:
Accident Photos of Their Beautiful Daughter Released, ABC NEWS, Nov. 26,
2007, available at http://www.abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Story?
id=3872556&pagc=I.

71Id.
72 Comment Posting, http://www.youtube.com/comment_servlet?
all commcnts&v=AC6zt2yWWgA&fromurl=/watch%3Fv%3DAC6zt2yWWgA

73 Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace, VILL. VOICE, Dec. 23, 1993,
available at http://www.villagevoice.eom/2005-10-18/specials/a-rape-incybcrspace/.
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they were in his control, Bungle 'raped' these
women, violently and sadistically, and made it
seem as if they enjoyed the rape.74
Dibbell offers this description of how the virtual violence
affected the real- life women whose avatars were assaulted:
[T]he woman in Seattle who had written
herself the character called Iegba, with a view
perhaps to tasting in imagination a deity's
freedom from the burdens of the gendered
flesh, got to read.., sentences in which Iegba,
messenger of the gods, lord of crossroads and
communications, suffered a brand of
degradation all-too-customarily reserved for
the embodied female. 75
The Bungle incident .vas not unique, either. Dibbell and others
relate that female-identified MUDers frequently experienced
sexual attacks. 76
In 1995, a University of Michigan student named Jake
Baker submitted a story about raping, torturing, and murdering a
fellow student to alt.sex.stories Usenet group. Baker used the
fellow student's real name in the story. Once notified of the
incident, the University of Michigan police searched Baker's
computer and found several similar stories on his hard drive,
along with email correspondence with a man named Arthur
Gonda. This correspondence included details of plans for the
two men to meet in order to carry out the real-life rape, torture
and murder that they fantasized about. Judge Avem Cohn
dismissed the case, ruling that there was no evidence Baker
74LESSIG, supra note 19 at 74-75.

75Dibbell, supra note 77.
76 Avatar rape has become a valued commodity in virtual environments.
Second Life users can pay for rape experiences using Linden dollars (Second
Life currency), with options including "Rape victim," "Get raped," or "Hold
Victim." See Michael Bugeja, Avatar Rape, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Feb. 25, 2010,
available at http://www.insidchighered.com/ views/2010/02/25/bugeja. Several
popular computer games feature rape scenarios, including Grand Theft Auto and
Rapelay (the latter features rape as the primary goal of the game).
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actually intended to act out his fantasies.

7

Sites that thrive on gossip and insults, like AutoAdmit and
JuicyCampus (JuicyCampus has now folded, only to be replaced
by another college campus gossip site78), direct much of their
negative attention to women and girls, many of whom do not
themselves participate in these online communities. The
comments sections of many online newspapers, blogs, and video
hosting sites are rife with obscene, sexist abuse targeted at
specific women. Social networking sites such as Facebook and
MySpace have become highly effective outlets for vengeful men
to attack ex-girlfriends, and an extraordinary number of sites are
exclusively devoted to "revenge porn," which is defined by the
Urban Dictionary as "[h]omemade por uploaded by an ex
girlfriend or (usually) ex boyfriend after particularly vicious
breakup as a means of humiliating the ex or just for own
amusement. '79 An entire class of web sites caters to fetishizing
real-life violence, a number of which explicitly favor pictures of
female victims.80
B. Cyberspace as a State of License
Part I noted the similarity between the way cyberspace
77 United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d. 1492,1496 (6th Cir. 1997). For
commentary on the implications of the Baker case, see, e.g., Robert Kurman
Kclner, United States v. Jake Baker: Revisiting Threats and the First
Amendment, 84 VA. L. REV. 287 (1998); David C. Potter, The Jake Baker Case:
True Threats and New Technology, 79 B.U. L. REV. 779 (1999); Steven G. Gey,
A Few Questions about Cross Burning, Intimidation, and Free Speech, 30
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287 (2005).

78Nora Sorena Casey, Juicy Campus Folds Citing Lack of Funds, Makes
Way for New Gossip Site, THE CHI. MAROON, Feb. 10, 2009, available at http://
www.chicagomaroon.com/2009/2/I 0/juicy-campus-folds-citing-lack-of-fundsmakes-way-for-new-student-gossip-site. At least two of these sites are spending
a lot of money seeking to capture JuicyCampus' former audience. See Jeffrey R.
Young, They're Back, and They're Bad: Campus-Gossip Web Sites, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDU., Aug. 31, 2007, available at http://chronicle.com/articlc/Theyre-

BackTheyre-Bad /48220/?sid=wb&utm source=wb&utm medium=en.
79 JonasOooohyeah, Revenge Porn, URBANDICTIONARY.COM (Sept. 25,
2007), http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?tcrm=revenge%20porn.
s0To avoid providing publicity for these sites, this'Article will not name
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idealists describe cyberspace and the way John Locke describes
the state of nature as one of perfect liberty. The examples given
above tell a very different story. They paint a world in which
only certain individuals enjoy the mythic degree of liberty and
freedom from physical restraints touted by cyberspace idealists,
while others experience a loss of liberty and a re-entrenchment
of physical restraints already unequally imposed upon them in
the offline world. Women targeted by cyber harassment
experience restrictions in liberty both in cyberspace and out of it.
They experience new levels of objectification, confronting
reductions of themselves to sexualized body parts in message
boards, chat rooms, social networking sites, and Google
searches. Women who have been targeted by cyber harassment
avoid certain sites to avoid being attacked; they close down
email accounts that have been flooded with abusive and obscene
messages; they shut down blogs; in some cases, they withdraw
from what were lucrative and vibrant online presences. The
losses of liberty follow them offline, as well: they face
harassment and slander stemming from online attacks in their
workplaces and schools, leading them to quit or change jobs and
universities; they change their daily routines for fear of being
stalked,
stalked or physically assaulted; they are sometimes
8
assaulted or even killed by their online harassers. '
Some of the other harms, especially hedonic ones, are
harder to quantify but are no less powerful for the toll that
harassment takes on women's sexual identity, which can be
extreme and enduring. 82 Sexual autonomy is undoubtedly an
important aspect of liberty; sexually autonomous agents do not
repress, denigrate, or distance themselves from their sexuality
because of fear of ridicule, threats, or vengeful disclosure of
private intimate acts. Yet in an environment where women are
frequently subjected to unwanted sexual attention, harassment,
and public shaming for their sexuality, this is precisely what

8! See Citron, supra note 5, at 69-81.
82

See e.g., Robin West, The Difference in Women

'

Hedonic Lives: A

Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J.

149 (2000).
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83
some women are forced to do.

Locke's notion of liberty, like that of many others, is tied to
equality and independence and is not to be understood as
something that can be used to harm others. As mentioned above,
Locke explicitly distinguishes between the state of liberty and
what he called the "state of license."
But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is
not a state of licence: though man in that state
have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his
person or possessions .... The state of nature
has a law of nature to govern it which obliges
every one: and reason, which is that law,
teaches all mankind, who will but consult it,
that being all equal and independent, no one
ought to harm another in his life, health,
liberty, or possessions. 84
Where cyber harassment persists unchecked, women are not
treated as equal members of society. Harassers use their freedom
to deny freedom to the women they attack, an exercise not of
liberty, but license.
Efforts to regulate Internet harassment, for example by
limiting the veritable immunity provided to web hosts by CDA §
230, have been characterized as ruinous attempts to destroy
cyberspace paradise. Reforming CDA § 230 is of course not the
only possible legal response to online harasment, and the task of
reform would require difficult balancing, but increased
regulation is not per se inconsistent with liberty. Cyberspace has
never been a state of perfect or even almost perfect liberty. It has
always been a realm of unequal distributions of liberty and
license. The notion of cyberspace as a paradise is fictional,
unless what one means by paradise is a place where certain
groups (e.g., men) have disproportionate access to liberty over

83 See Anupam Chander, Youthful Indiscretions, in THE OFFENSIVE
INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION (Saul Lcvmore & Martha C.

Nussbaum cds., 2010).
84 LOCKE,

supra notc 17 at 102.
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other groups (e.g., women). 85 If cyberspace ever had the
potential to become a paradise, its fall was caused by its own
inhabitants-by the cyber harassers.
Locke writes that when mankind finds itself unable to
preserve the state of nature, it necessarily must establish the rule
of law.86 If individuals abuse their liberty by exercising power in
arbitrary and self-interested ways that threaten the security of the
87
whole community, the community will slide into a state of war.
In a state of war, anyone at any time might be deprived of his or
her liberty and possessions. 88 To avoid this outcome, the
community collectively establishes a central authority and rules
to regulate disputes. This necessarily involves giving up some of
what Locke considers to be "natural rights" (e.g., the right to
personally punish someone who has wronged you).89 But it also
results in liberty for more people and security for most of one's
other rights. 90 Security for the general public-not just for the
strongest or most aggressive-is the basis for the forfeiture of
some individual power. Put another way, rules ensure a measure
of equality for all. 91
The same can be said of regulations of speech on the
internet. New legal regulations regarding behavior in cyberspace
might indeed mean, in some sense, that some individuals will no
longer have the same degree of "liberty" they had previously. It
would mean, for example, that cyber harassers could no longer
attack women with impunity. But the freedom to harass is an
exercise of license, not liberty, and as such is hardly defensible
in the first instance. The effects of such license, moreover, are
85 Unfortunately, this is quite in line with many religious conceptions of

Paradise.
86LOCKE, supra note 17 at 154-56.
87Id. at 107.
88 Id.

at 154.

89

Id. at 155-56.

90

Id.
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that women as a group suffer a loss of liberty relative to men as
a group. Regulation and reform are necessary to balance the
equation and create a cyberspace that maximizes liberty for all
groups.
C. Tyranny in the Marketplace
As discussed in Part I, much contemporary cyberspace
idealism rhetoric is couched in terms of free speech values.
Cyberspace, as a great equalizing environment-the great
equalizing environment-is often touted as the true marketplace
of ideas, where the conventional wisdom that the best response
to bad speech is more speech can truly be put into practice.
Though the expression "marketplace of ideas" was not his, John
Stuart Mill is often heralded as the forefather of the principle of
free speech and civil liberties more generally. Thus his theory of
liberty is often invoked as a response to calls for regulation of
speech on the intemet.
Though Mill's On Liberty is a nuanced and enduring
dissertation on the complexity of civil liberties, the marketplace
of ideas metaphor (and free speech more generally) is often
simplistically invoked as an answer to any attempt to regulate
content that some group would like to have. The very flexibility
of the term, claimed as it is by groups of every ideological and
political stripe when it suits them, gives some indication of its
conceptual instability. Inasmuch as the metaphor is a coherent
one, it has been trenchantly critiqued on many grounds. Serious
and important questions include: what counts as an idea? Does
anything like a free and equal marketplace for ideas actually
exist? Has it ever existed? Is truth actually the highest value of a
free society? Can a "marketplace" of ideas produce truth in any
case? 92
This Article does not intend to review all the objections to
the concept of the marketplace of ideas. Rather, this Article
suggests that while Mill does indeed provide a great deal of
92 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1996); CASS R.

(1995); STANLEY
FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING As FREE SPEECH: AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too
(1994); MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
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insight into the debate over cyber harassment, this is precisely
because his analysis of liberty and harm is far more sophisticated
than suggested by a reactionary and simplistic invocation of the
marketplace of ideas. 93 The way cyber idealists misunderstand
Mill's concept of liberty tracks the way they confuse liberty and
license - that is, they mischaracterize the status quo. Cyberspace
idealists assume that cyberspace is and always was a paradise
that needs only to be defended. But what Mill offers in On
Liberty is first and foremost a diagnosis of what is wrong with
the status quo, not an idealization of it. It is through recognition
of current wrongs that he fashions his recommendations for
safeguarding liberty. Cyberspace idealists, when they invoke
"free speech" or the "marketplace of ideas" as slogans, ignore
this diagnostic dimension. Mill argues that we need to honor
principles of free speech precisely because so many individuals94
and groups are denied the speech and liberty that others enjoy.
Inasmuch as Mill claimed that the best answer to bad speech was
more speech, he understood that this meant changing the
conditions under which certain individuals are silenced and
intimidated not'only by the 95state, but sometimes, even more
despotically, by society itself.
Indeed, free speech advocates who maintain that we need
only be concerned with the government 's interference with free
speech-who seem to think only the government can interfere
with free speech--can hardly claim Mill as a fellow traveler. To
the contrary, Mill was in some ways even more concerned about
the way that the majority could exercise tyranny in society than
he was concerned about the same tendency in government.
Society can and does execute its own
mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates
instead of right, or any mandates at all in

13

For more on Mill and offensive speech in the marketplace of ideas, see

Mary Anne Franks, For the Love of Hate: Why We Have Little To FearFrom the
Westboro Baptist Church, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/03/
for-the-love-of-hate-why-we-have-little-to-fcar-from-the-westboro-baptistchurch.html.
94 MILL, supra note I I at 19-20.
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things with which it ought not to meddle, it
practises a social tyranny more formidable
than many kinds of political oppression, since,
though not usually upheld by such extreme
penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape,
penetrating much more deeply into the details
of life, and enslaving the soul itself. 96
The cyber harassment highlighted in this Article is a form of
social tyranny. To argue that women who are targeted by such
harassment should simply not participate in cyberspace
communities, as many anti-regulation advocates argue, both
tacitly endorses the deprivation of their liberty to participate in
any communities that they wish to, and ignores the extent to
which individuals increasingly cannot simply ignore or exit the
harassment they experience. Such harassment follows them into
their physical lives, indeed into the "details of their life."
Mill did not observe the wrongs committed by society with
mere regret, believing them a necessary evil that could not be
addressed through regulation. Mill called for the restriction of
society's interference with the private person.
Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of
the magistrate is not enough: there needs
protection also against the tyranny of the
prevailing opinion and feeling; against the
tendency of society to impose, by other means
than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices
as rules of conduct on those who dissent from
them; to fetter the development, and, if
possible, prevent the formation, of any
individuality not in harmony with its ways,
and compel all characters to fashion
97
themselves upon the model of its own.
Cyber harassment against women imposes an identity upon them
that denies them the liberty exercised by many other groups in
96

1d. at6.

91Id. at 6-7.
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to fashion their own existence and to
cyberspace 98-iberty
explore dimensions of experience denied to them in their
physical reality. When women act in ways that do not conform
to cyber harassers' normative view of women, they are punished
for it. This of course does not mean that harassment's effects are
absolute. It is possible for some women to escape harassment in
all contexts and for all women, probably, to escape it in at least
some contexts. But tyranny does not have to be absolute to be
effective. Oppression need not be experienced by every single
member of a group, all of the time, to qualify as such.
To be sure, Mill believed that finding and enforcing the
limit of collective opinion's interference with individual identity
was a difficult and complex task. He would undoubtedly not
have supported a regime that censored, either legally or socially,
every bad expression of social opinion. But nor would he have
ignored the harms of harassment, especially considering the
extent-to which these harms can be magnified in cyberspace to
affect individuals' liberty both on and offline. A marketplace in
which some are threatened, defamed, or harassed by others,
where some groups are granted or denied access to the
marketplace on that basis, is not a free and open marketplace.
Nor is the principle of free speech upheld when some groups are
judged not by the value of their speech but by the terms of their
unwilling embodiment and objectification.
Ill. No Exit: The Double-Embodiment Effect
The phenomenon of forced embodiment of course predates
the Internet. The reduction of women to their bodies has been a
tactic of sexist and misogynist forces for a very long time. While
many groups of people can and have been susceptible to
unwilling embodiment, one can make the general observation
that women's experience with sexual objectification is greater
than that of men, and that men have been largely responsible for
this objectification. 99 There is a long history in Western culture
(although not only in Western culture) of viewing women as
merely physical creatures with no capacities for rational thought

98 To varying degrccs.
19 See e.g., West, supra notc 86.
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or refined feeling. As the influential Viennese philosopher Otto
Weininger put it, in the "absolute female," a woman lacking any
male personality traits, "there are no logical and ethical
phenomena, and, therefore, the ground for the assumption of a
soul is absent."'1 Catharine MacKinnon, among others, has
detailed the various ways in which women as a group are
0
objectified, especially sexually objectified, by men as a group.' '
Martha Nussbaum has also examined objectification in depth,
noting that the instrumental treatment of human beings is a
"common feature of sexual life, especially . . . in connection
with male treatment of women. '10 2 There is no need to re-invent
the wheel here; suffice it to say that women are still fighting to
be recognized as full rational agents, having been considered
inferior to men by both law and society for centuries. Though in
modem Western society women have come quite far in
achieving equal rights to men, the unfortunate legacies of
disenfranchisement, unbalanced laws governing family, crime
and property, and the denial of equal educational and
occupational opportunity endure. Today, women still struggle for
reproductive control of their bodies, and rape, domestic
violence, and sexual harassment still enforce the view that
women are objects who belong to, or are at least subject to the
03
desires of men. 1
Given the extent to which women in their real lives are
100OTTO
101

WEININGER, SEX AND CHARACTER 186 (1907).

See, e.g., CATHARINE A.

MACKINNON, FEMINISM

UNMODIFIED:

DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979); ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN
HATING (1974).
102 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 238 (1999).

Nussbaum maintains that objectification need not be a morally problematic
phenomenon, articulating seven ways that people can be treated as things: "[AII
types of objectification are not equally objectionable... the evaluation of any of
them requires a careful evaluation of context and circumstance, and ... at least
some of them might be compatible with consent and equality, and even be
'wonderful' parts of sexual life." Id. at 218. Nussbaum has also written recently
on objectification in the context of the online abuse of women. See Martha C.
Nussbam, Objectification and Internet Misogyny, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET,
supra note 87.
'0' See e.g., ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 100-09 (1997).
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disproportionately and unwillingly reduced to their bodies, it is
not surprising that women approached the promise of cyberspace
with great enthusiasm. Consider again Barlow's ringing words
from the Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace:
"Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought
itself, arrayed like a standing wave in the web of our
communications. Ours is a world that is both everywhere and
nowhere, but it is not where bodies live." 1°4 The promise of
cyberspace seems to be the power to escape one's body and
become a "standing wave" of language, of thought, of
imagination. Cyberspace seemed to offer an extraordinary
possibility for women
to subvert the longstanding idea that
"anatomy is destiny."' 1 5 In the early years of the Internet, many
women saw cyberspace as offering much more than a chance to
join message boards or play online games; some saw in
cyberspace the promise of a new society. The cyberfeminist
movement, a term coined in 1992 by an Australian collective
called the VNS Matrix, saw cyberspace as the opportunity 10to6
break down established binaries, especially gender binaries.
The British philosopher and writer Sadie Plant saw in
cyberspace a radically feminizing potential: "Masculine identity
has everything to lose from this new technics. The sperm count
falls as the replicants stir and the meat learns how to learn for
itself. Cybernetics is feminisation.' 10 7 Sherry Turkle believed
that the gender-swapping practices enabled in cyberspace
produced a new reflectiveness and sophistication about gender
identity that would translate into the real world. 10 8 Donna
Haraway composed a "Cyborg Manifesto" in which she
observed, "Up till now (once upon a time), female embodiment
seemed to be given, organic, necessary," but now we can ask,
4Barlow, supra note 7.
105SIGMUND
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(1924).
"0 Mary-Anne Breeze, Attack of the CyberFeminsts, SWITCH, available at
http://switch.sjsu.edu/web/v4n I/artmez.html (last visited June 20, 2011).
107Sadie Plant, Feminisations:Reflections on Women and Virtual Reality,
in CLICKING IN AND CLICKING ON: HOT LINKS TO A DIGITAL CULTURE 37 (Lynn

Hershman Leeson ed., 1996).
108 See SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN (1997).
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"[w]hy should our bodies end at the skin?" 109
But, as we have seen, this optimism about women's selfcreation or re-creation has failed to materialize in many
important ways. The forced avatarization of women in
cyberspace is a grotesque parody of self-creation, with effects
often more widespread and lasting than objectification in the
physical world. Far from being the site of radical gender
deconstruction, or a realm of sophisticated reflection on gender
roles, or a world offering freedom from the forced
objectification of women's bodies, cyberspace has become a
place (or rather, places) that works in tandem with and reinforces
women's unwilling embodiment.
The fact that women's unwilling online embodiment is in
effect a double-embodiment is one of the reasons that
cyberspace harassment of women should be taken seriously.
Women are frequently objectified in real life in ways that
negatively impact their health, careers and general well-being,
and are then re-objectified online in ways that also negatively
impact their health, careers and general well-being. In the offline
world, women are disproportionately "bodied"-over-identified
with their physical characteristics-through their physical
vulnerability relative to men and their historical, legal, and
social objectification. Many women go online in the hope that
they will be able to escape or go beyond some of the effects of
real-life objectification, only to discover that objectification
awaits them there as well. Thus, it is not merely that women
experience less of the liberty that cyberspace idealism promises
relative to men; it is that this loss of liberty is a second loss,
compounding the effects of offline social subordination.
A final point to note is that the effects of unwilling online
embodiment are potentially even more pernicious and longlasting than real-life harassment. This is due to four features of
cyberspace that exacerbate the impact of harassment:

1. Anonymity: The increased opportunity
for harassers to attack their targets
109
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anonymously, making it difficult if not
impossible for the targets to engage in
self-help or legal remedies;
2.

Amplification: The capacity for
harassers to quickly find a wide audience
for their harassment, including users
who will join in the harassment;

3. Permanence: Online attacks, which
often include personal information about
their targets, such as home addresses and
telephone numbers, are very difficult to
erase from the web;

4.

Virtual Captivity/Publicity: The options
to avoid or exit situations in which cyber
harassment occurs are extremely limited.
Whereas specific acts of real-life
harassment are often restricted to one
place (for example, being harassed on
the street does not necessarily impact
one's experience in the workplace), t t0
the effects of cyberspace harassment can
manifest much more readily. Particularly
if the online attack is indexable by a
major search engine like Google, it is
accessible to almost anyone (the target's
co-workers, fellow students, clients,
children) almost anywhere (at her place
of work, her school, her home, her
doctor's office).

The law's response to cyberspace harassment should be
considered against the background of the double-embodiment
effect on women, and be placed in the larger context of
collective discrimination and social stratification in which this
harassment occurs.

110Although it certainly can. For more on the cffects of street harassment,
see Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the hiformal Ghettoization
of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1993).
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IV.

OBJECTIONS

This Part addresses two objections: one, .the concern that
this Article takes an essentialist view of cyberspace,
discrimination, and women; and two, that current legal discourse
on cyberspace harassment already properly accounts for its real
harms.
A. Essentialism
Scholars have debated whether cyberspace can and/or
should be conceived of as a "place" at all. 1'' Cyberspace is not,
indeed, a "place" as such, or any one thing at all. It is both more
and less complex than any one "place": it denotes, at the most
basic level, a set of protocols for transferring information, and
beyond that, is a diverse and far-ranging assortment of
communities, message boards, chat rooms, websites, and games.
It is useful, however, to use the term "cyberspace" as shorthand
for all of these things and as a way to differentiate between what
happens there versus what happens in physical space. "1 2 It would
perhaps be better, however, to refer to "cyberspaces" rather than
cyberspace to indicate the plurality and variety of peoples'
interactions with cyberspace.
As someone who does not wish to essentialize
"cyberspace," I accordingly do not think a "law of
cyberspace"'1 3 is needed as such. I do'believe, however, that
cyberspace presents an important and complex legal challenge.
This challenge consists not only of figuring out how best to
conceptualize behavior in cyberspace to resemble behavior in
real life, but also to interrogate the accuracy and efficacy of
existing legal structures.
There are, of course, also problems associated with any
I See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 210 (2007); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the
Digital Anticommons, 91 CALF. L. REV. 439, 446-58 (2003); Dan L. Burk, The
Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL& EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 28 (2000).
112Or,
113See

as netizcns call it, IRL (in real life).
Frank Eastcrbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U.

CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996).
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project that attempts to treat "women" or "men" as a
homogeneous group. Women's experiences, both on and offline,
are diverse and mediated through race, class, socio-economic
status, and many other factors, and the same is true for men. This
Article does not claim that the unwilling avatars narrative is the
story of how all women are victimized by all men in cyberspace.
It does not even claim that any individual woman's online
experience is determined solely or even principally by
harassment. Given the vastness and variety of the ways most of
us experience the Intemet, from private email accounts to news
websites to restaurant reviews, it is unlikely that any person's
entiie cyberspace experience is dominated by the effects of
harassment.
However, none of this means that one cannot discuss the
broad patterns of wrongs perpetrated by one group against
another group, both in real life and in cyberspace. The extent to
which any one member of the wronged group feels wronged, or
any one member of the wronging group participates in the
wrongdoing, can vary greatly. Not every African-American or
gay person feels wronged by racism or homophobia; not every
white or straight person participates in racism and homophobia.
Moreover, the specific contours of what even constitutes racism
and homophobia are often contested. Nonetheless, few would
claim that racism and homophobia do not exist in contemporary
4
American society. The same is true for sexism and misogyny. "1
B. Current Legal Conceptions of Cyberspace
Harassment
Some scholars argue that we already have adequate legal
remedies for cyberspace harassment, namely, laws against
defamation, threats, and invasions of privacy. There are three
reasons that these remedies are insufficient.'l 5 First among these
14
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141 (1993) (arguing that harassment and

abuse of some women by some men constructs background conditions that
impose costs on all women and costs to all men should the conditions change).
15 For more on the limitations of current legal approaches to the online
harassment of women, see Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0
(forthcoming, MARYLAND LAW REVIEW, 2011).
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reasons, as many scholars and practitioners have pointed out, "16
is an enforceability issue: user anonymity combined with the
content provider immunity provided for by CDA § 230 means
that often no one can be held responsible for a given act of
harassment.
Secondly, and more importantly for the purposes of this
Article, there is a class of abusive online behavior that does not
fall into or is not best captured by the categories of defamation,
threats, or invasions of privacy. Violent sexual commentary
suggesting "should be done" to certain women or graphically
sexual statements about a woman's physical appearance do not
necessarily fall under any of the three categories. Thus, legal
approaches that focus on reputation and privacy will not be able
to address some of the most serious forms of cyber
harassment. 1 7 Moreover, even harms that can be categorized
this way may actually be made worse by legal remedies based
on reputation and privacy interests. If one of the significant
harms of harassment is unwanted subjection to public scrutiny,
litigation over defamation and invasions of privacy are almost
certain to exacerbate this harm. Defamation is particularly
problematic in this respect. Because truth is a defense to
defamation, harassers being sued for defamation may attempt to
defend themselves by searching for and publishing "proof' of
their claims. While doing so may expose these harassers to
liability for invasions of privacy, they may be able to inflict
severe and irreparable harm in the process.
Thirdly, and most importantly, tort and criminal approaches
treat cyber harassment principally as harm done to individuals,
not groups. While the cyber harassment of women certainly does
involve serious individual harm, its impact on women as a group
16

See e.g., Citron, supra note 5, at 116-17.
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needs to be emphasized. 1I8 The cyber harassment of women is a
form of collective discrimination and should be treated as
such. 119
CONCLUSION

Cyberspace has extraordinary potential to be a site of
liberation, transcendence and social equality. The opportunity to
escape physical constraints imposed on one's identity and to
exert control over one's self-representation can be particularly
valuable to members of groups who have been marginalized on
the basis of physical characteristics. The kinds of cyberspace
harassment described in this Article deny women this
opportunity, forcing them to become unwilling avatars whose
bodies are used to re-entrench social inequalities. Creating false
profiles on social networking sites, uploading images to
"revenge pom" sites without consent, and launching violent
sexual attacks on message boards all have tremendous
discriminatory effects. This harassment compromises women's
ability to share cyberspace on equal terms with men, and
amplifies the sexual stereotyping and discrimination women
experience in the offline world. The legal response to cyberspace
harassment must be formulated against the background of the
discriminatory harms facilitated by cyberspace, harms that are
often obscured by idealistic rhetoric about cyberspace. The
potential for cyberspace to deliver on its idealistic promise is
contingent upon the recognition of and response to the
discriminatory harms currently being perpetrated in it. Without
thoughtful and realistic assessment of these harms, we risk
allowing cyberspace to become yet another site of discrimination
and social stratification-merely one more familiar, and broken,
18 For a discussion on the importance of articulating the harms done to
women because they are women in terms of collective, not individual, harm, see
Catharine MacKinnon, Directions in Sexual HarassmentLaw, 31 NOVA L. REV.
225, 227 (2007). For more on why certain forms of cyber harassment should be
considered discrimination, see Mary Anne Franks, The Banality of Cyber
Discrimination, or The Eternal Recurrence of September, DU PROCESS: AN
ONLINE SUPPLEMENT TO THE DENVER UNIV. L. REV., Feb. 2010, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=l 569202.
119In another work, this Author details why and how certain forms of
gender-based cyber harassment should be treated as sexual harassment. See Mary
Anne Franks, supra note 119.
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world.
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